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Article 5

Book Reviews
A General Rhetoric by Group M (J. Dubois, F. Edeline, J.-M. Klinkenberg, P.
Minguet, F. Pire, H. Trinon), translated by Paul B. Burrell and Edgar M.
Slatkin. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1981.
Pp. xix + 254. $18.95.
General RbetOf}-ic, first published in 1970, is the product of a group of neorhetoricians from Liege. It is an attempt at a linguistically based synthetic theory
of poetic figures, the part of rhetoric known as elocutio. The synthetic theory is
the work's main claim to be "general ))~" general" as in "general linguistic
theory," i.e. formally articulated, systematic and inclusive. It also claims generality in that the theory gives a unified account of figures at all levels from sound,
syntax, semantics, refer.ence, to (sketchily) whole text. The authors are less confident about claiming generality in the sense of trans historical or transcultural
applicability; these extensions are only briefly touched on. As far as any tendency
to demonstrate ge:l1eralizability is concerned, it must be said that the range of
literary exemplification is restricted largely to modern and modernist poetry and
fiction in French and English. Frankly, this limitation is likely to be more than
fortuitous, since linguistic deviationist theory (to which this is at least close kin)
has strong affinities with modernist writing. But, anyway, we have no basis for
deciding whether the theory could be generalized beyond French, or beyond
modern literature, because Group p. never consider the criteria for valid generalizability in these senses. What they do tackle, at least to some extent, is the
question of the validity of their theory for rhetorical phenomena in modes of
discourse other than "poetry" or "literature": one of the benefits of a linguistics-based theory is that such a question is raised and considered quite naturally.
Besides non-literary modes of languag.e, such as newspaper 'headlines, some sections of the book make a semiotic extension to the non-linguistic genres of
theatre and film.
As the translators say, this is likely to be a difficult book for anyone ,\1'ho has
not the relevant background in French (and related) linguistic and semiotic
theory: Saussure, Benveniste, Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Barthcs, Todorov, Greimas,
Genette. It is not that the linguistics itself is difficult, but that the distinctions
and terminology are likely to he unfamiliar to Anglo-Saxon students, and they
are handled allusively and metaphorically in this book. Clarity is not helped by
a stilted and unreli,able translation, a matter to which I shall return.
According to Group p.. literature is a radical transformation of language effected
by the, application of rhetorical figures or metaboleS'o Allegedly, this transformation "disqualifies poetry as language" (p. 9), presumably by disrupting referential communication. This extreme and fanciful notion is encouraged by Jakobson's driving a wedge between "poetic" and other uses of language, but fortunately Group p. do not leave hold of language entirely, for they are clear that
a rhetorical figure only works if it is perceived in relation to a presupposed
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normality-" a metaphor is perceived only if it acts simultaneously in the usual
sense and in the figured sense. It is, therefore, the norm-deviation r.elationship,
and not the deviation as such, that makes style" (p. 15). "Norm" or "degree
zero" is very hazily characterized by the Group; their intuitive base-line is,

judging by references, scientific prose or writing about the history of science, but
they also admit that degree zero is an idealization, not a specific style: denotation
without connotation, language discounting all but the essential units of signification (pp. 30-31).
The metaboles or figures which transform discourse are detected alterations

of these essential units. They work like Riffaterre's "stylistic devices": they are
local eca7ts which are unexpected, hold up the reader's linear progress through
the, text and require response and interpretation (p. 38). The enemy of this kind
of deviation is convention: a deviation arrests the reader and requires response
if it is a marked departure from G. continuous norm; but if a particular type of
deviation is repeated often, it will enter into the constitution of the norm and
lose its force. The Group's psychological/aesthetic theory is extended by certain speculations about aesthetic effects (Ch. 6). A metabole or stylistic device
is a stimulus to aesthetic response (" ethos "). But metaboles are aesthetically
polyvalent: the exact response will depend on the relation of the metabole to its
stylistic macrocontext in Riffaterre's sense, the patterned organization of the text
as a whole.
This framework of assumptions about" poetic language" is, frankly, commonplace, solidly located within the. context of ideas familiar through the work of
Shldovsky, Jakobson, Mukarovsk)r, Riffaterre and others. Since the book does
not offer itself as criticism-the texts cited being merely fragments exemplifying
types of figurer--wherein lies the work's originality or, what part of literary studies does it facilitate? The answer can only be the way in which it is suggested
that a taxonomy of rhetorical figures be derived. The aim of Group p, is to
present a unified explanation of figures as applications of a small number of consistent operations to specific structures of language. Thus, the basis of the
rhetorical classification is an account of the levels of language, abstractly considered, from phonetics through morphology, syntax, semantics, to text structure
and pragmatics; of the relationships between levelsj and of the units found at each
level (distinctive features, sentences, phrases, lexemes, etc.). The linguistic model
used is attributed to Benveniste; it is a very traditional linguisic thory, and :in
This book it is articulated in very general tenns: the linguistic basis is sound but
very much lacking in details. For example, a "distinctive feature" approach to
phonology and to semantics is implied, but there is no justification of a feature
analysis, nor any detailed indication of what kinds of features are assumed to
enter into phonetic or semantic decomposition. Such lack of detail about the
status of sp.ecific units at the different levels is a serious shortcoming for anyone
who wishes to use Group p,'s methods, since it is never exactly clear to what kinds
of linguistic entities the metabole-producing operations apply. However, this
v.agueness does not invalidate the system, for the details could be supplied in a
more precise linguistic model. It does mean, however, that much of the analysis
in the book has to be taken on trust, intuitively.
The final piece of apparatus is the set of operations which are applied to
linguistic units to produce rhetorical figures (pp. 40-44). These are loosely Ilna-
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legalls to transformations in transformational-generative grammar, but they have
a different function: not to generate grammatical structures but to "break rules
or invent new ones" (d. p. 40). Four operations are proposed: suppression of
some unit, whether a constituent such as a syllable or a word, or a feature; addition of a unit; suppression-addition which amounts to substitution; and permutation which governs figures such as syntactic inversion. These operations produce different classes of figure depending on the level of linguistic structure to
which they are applied; here Group p, indulge in some fairly priddy neologisms:
metaplasms are transformations of phonological and morphological units, metataxes are figures acting on the syntactic structure of the sentence, metasememes
are semantic alterations, and finally metalogisms alter the logical value of sentences, their relationship with the world outside language.
Combining the plan of linguistic levels with the various types of rhetorical operation produces a categorization of rhetorical figures which is tabulated on p.
45: e.g. metataxes involving suppression include ellipsis, zeug;ma, asyndeton, parataxis; metalogisms with addition include hyperbole, and so on. Chapters 2-5 discuss and extensively illustrate figures at each of the four levels; Chapter 6 is, as
already indicated, a preliminary discussion of aesthetic effects associated with
figures. The remaining two chapters, under the heading" Toward a General
Rhetoric," discuss figures of narrative voice and narrative structure, organizing
the account by reference to the same operations of suppression, addition, etc.,
with illustrations from theatre and film as well as prose fiction. I do not think
that this extension of the system adds anything new to the insights of the more
established structuralist writings on such topics as point of view, plot structure,
etc., and it is less sophisticated than the work of such writers as Barthes and
Genette.
Finally there is "Afterword: Rhetorical Mirrors: Seven Years of Reflection"
in which the authors enter into debate with some criticisms of the first edition
of the book. They concede some limitations; but A General Rhetoric remains
an ingenious and linguistically provocative work which promises the basis of a
universal, systematic rhetoric, and which deserves further discussion and development. It remains now to consider the usefulness of this new English translation.
I find the French structuralists and post-structuralists just as difficult in English translation as in French. The stylistic playfulness, the fanciful neologisms and
the dependence on imprecise spatial metaphors are not simplified by renderings
into one's own language-they are JUSt more distracting. In fact, Rbhorique
generale is not extravagantly stylized in these respects, and it is a good subject
for translation. The forbidding difficulty might have been the reliance on examples drawn from modern French poetry. The translators have had to decide
in each case whether ra translation of the French illustrative citation would preserve the figure and make the point, or whether a new English example should
be substituted. On the whole they have coped well with this part of their task,
substituting well-chosen English examples where necessary (mainly in the areas
of metaplasms and metasememes) and translating prose, syntactic, examples where
the point does not get lost. Granted, one could quibble with some examples: for
instance, the discussion of "a tour unforgettable of Italy" and similar examples
of adjective-placement; which is invalidated by the fact that the rules are quite
different in English and French, or the trivialization of Comeille's reverberant
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m. .ymoron obscure clarte by translating it, unidentified, as "cloudy clarity" (pp.
66 and 123). But on the whole the ex<amples are effective; it is the translation of
the text itself which is unsatisfactory.
One is alerted to the possibility of mechanical errors by mistakes in quoted
French early in the book: "significant" for significant (p. xvi), "haineus" for
baineuse (p. 2). I am not an expert on translation from French, but it does seem
to me that many words and phrases have been mis-rendered through failure to
relate the text to the context of argument it presupposes. Why, for example, is
n§cit translated as "short story" on p. 18? It surely has the very general meaning "narrative," as elsewhere in the book, and generally in French narratology.
On p. 20 the phrase" these very things" translates les cboses memes which in my
judgment of the context means I( things themselves"; certainly the "these" is
wrong in its suggestion of reference to some co-textual antecedent. On p. 31 we
have "the literary act" for Ie fait litteraire. Fait can mean" act," but not here:
the Group is discussing lexicostatistical proposals for describing the "fact" or
" essence n of literariness. The translators vacillate between "act" and "fact II
in many similar contexts, but "act" gives the wrong impression because the
Group are not concerned with a pragmatic, actional theory of literature as, for
instance, Ohmann, Pratt and others have been. In the same sentence there appear to be a quite ludicrous error: des listes de fdquence dites "normales" is
rendered "frequency lists called normales" instead of "frequency lists said to
be normal" or in better English" lists of frequencies said to be normal." For a
final example of mistranslation due to insensitivity to the context of argument,
see p. 28: une collection de traits distinctifs bierarcbise5 becomes "a collection
of hierarchically distinctive features" (their italics). This misrepresents linguistic theory-distinctive features may be hierarchically ordered, but it is meaningless to say that they are hierarchically distinctive.
Apart from mechanical errors, there are three sources of difficulty with
this translation. First, there is a literal and unidiomatic adherence to French
syntax: "the impossibility of constructing sentences semantically contradictory"
(p. 123) is not English; it is a slavish relexicalization of the well-formed French
l'interdiction de construire des phrases sbnantique111ent contradictoires. English
must prepose the adjective phrase (" semantically contradictory sentences") or
mark it as a relative clause (I( sentences which are semantically contradictory").
This is a very typical example of misplacement of adjectival and adverbial
phrases, 2nd failure to mark relative clauses, which makes the translation not only
stylistically alien but ,also difficult to decode. A second difficulty is unreliability
of cohesion between sentences and clauses, a lack of care to ensure that items
such as noun phrases refer to clearly identifiable antecedents. I could not understand the folIo-wing until I looked up the French:
A theory of linguistic levels has been developed by Benveniste. We
shall apply it here in a somewhat more general aspect, which will better
suit our remarks. Whether this application is on the plane of signifier
(phonic or graphic element) or of the signified (meaning), the chain
that is manifested can be considered a hierarchy of planes where discrete
units are 'articulated' (p. 25).
On connait la theorie des niveaux, developpee par Benveniste: nous lui
donnons iei un aspect un peu plus general, convenant mieux a notre
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propos. Que ce sait sur Ie plan du significant (phonique on graphique)
ou sur Ie plan du signifie (sens), la chaine manifestee peut chIe COllsideree camme nne hierarchie de plans, ou s' "articulent" des unites
discretes.
The second sentence means simply" Whether on the plane of the signifier ...";
the translators have unjustifiably introduced the phrase "this application," spuriously cohering with "'apply" and diverting attention from the theme of the
sentence, which is la chaine manifestee and its hierarchy of levels. This sort of
fault makes one suspect that the translators arc tackling their job sentence by
sentence vlith a precarious grasp of the drift of the ongoing argument.
Finally, compounding their own errors, the translators give the reader insufficient help by rendering the vague and half-metaphorical terms of structuralist
French by equally vague English equiv;alents. Although I am familiar with structuralist theory, I still need help with this dense paragraph:
NOlls n'oublions pas qu'on a pu reajuster la these saussurienne de l'arbitraire du signe, en montrant que. pour Ie sujCt parlant, rien n'est plus
necessaire que la connexion du significant et du signifie. Cependant, Ie
signe lui-meme, par-dela sa dualite constitutive, est distinct du referent:
Ie sens dernier du discours commun est bien dans cette visee des chases,
ala fois absentes (Ie mot n'est pas la chose) et presentes (Ie mot remplace
la chose).
We are not forgetting that the Saussurian thesis of the arbitrariness of
the sign can be adjusted by showing that for the speaker nothing is more
necessary than the connection between the signifier and the signified. Beyond its constitutive reality [sic], however, the sign itself is distinct from
the referent. The ultimate meaning of ordinary discourse is certainly in
this design of things, at once absent (the word is not the thing) and
present (the word replaces the thing). (pp. 21-22)
The mistranslation" reality" for duerlitJ confuses, but this is not the whole problem. A more expansive and explanatory translation (perhaps footnoted more),
particularly in explicating such hard-working non-technical terms as visee, would
have been very welcome. As it is, the translation is accessible only if one pays
continuous attention to the original for such clarification as can be derived from
the French.
ROGER FOWLER

University of Eerst Anglia

Saving the Text: Litererture/Derrida/Philosophy by Geoffrey H. Hartman. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. vi
184.
$12.95.

+

Ten years ago, an English transLation of critical analyses of "modem" music
first appeared in print, Boulez on Music Today, an unremittingly witty and polemical analysis of its subject. The work is formalist but also personal, and is a
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precise though fragmentary autobiography of a disciplined musical rhapsode
pursuing the task of analytic criticism. Several of these same strengths arc present in Hartman's book of literary, psychological, and philosophical comment.
One of the first things to strike the reader's eye is Hartman's exempla of
modern art by Adami, Magritte, Oldenburg, Lombardo, Boulee. The book's
cover is a light blue chroma print of Rene Magrittc's Le donzaine d'Arnheim, a
heightened and simultaneously bathetic parody of the genre of "mountain painting" and an expression of the" Olympian mind." In its serious aspects, the picture recalls Shelley's A10nt Blanc as a destruction of the pallid analogy maldng
of topographical verse preceding him. However, that determined stance is too
difficult to sustain: in the picture, the mountainous head of an eagle is a profile
against the horizon; the wings are the cascade of snow and ice falling to the valley below. A nest of three eggs rests on a plane surface, a balcony, sill, or wall in
the fore,ground "before" the vlewer. As with much of Magritte, this is an
elaborate conceit of signifier-signified, such as a painting of a room like his witty
Personal Values, or of a pipe which imitates commercial art in the realistic impression of a tobacconist's sign, a "painting" which is entitled, This is Not a
Pipe. Of tlus celebration of illusion, Hartman writes:
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Had Derrida begun his career with Glas Of the essay on Adami, our
perplexed judgment could hardly have avoided raising the issue of Mannerism, or of the resurgence of wit ... in philosophy. In modern art this
resurgence has been an obvious feature for som~ time. Magritte ... can
create a new "domrune enchante" by jokes that question the frame
though not the force of art. (35)
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Indeed, Derrida's texts and this explication are inescapable signals of the change
of modern literary temperament. Several forms of older literary modernism did
not much feature the play of ingenuity but did emphasize anxiety and collective
guilt, and its artists are descendants of Georg Buchner and Dostoevski. It in
some ways concludes with Sartre's novels and short stories, the characterization
of assassins, bigots, voyeurs, bourgeosie with limited consciousness, narrow perceptions, and" bad faith." Sartre's fiction celebrates the devious as antidote and
antitype. Lesage's Gil BIas is ironically figured in Nausea, which is in part a
polemic against the tailored appetites and stitched histories of the middle class.
Collections of some kinds of "modemism" often include heavy doses of guilt
and anti-intellectualism, two crops assiduously cultivated before the academic
troubles of a decade-and-a-half to a decade ago. An anthology introduction to
Dostoevski's Notes From the Underground suggests that readers, after initial
repulsion, then incredulity, then fascination, will perhaps identify with the antihero. Irving Howe provides a nine-point outline symptomatic of the year of
publication, 1968. I quote the first three and the last points of summary:

Intelligence is a disease from which man cannot escape: it dooms him to
self-pride and nCl'I'cissism.
Man is hopelessly split between the side of himself that wishes to act cmd
the side that wishes to observe.
It is often impossible to make a clear distinction bet·ween man's pride and
his humility: one masks the other.
What redeems life and gives it meaning is human suffering, an experience which, in its fullness of conscioumess, is possible only to mankind.
-Classics of Modern Fiction, pp. 9-10.
I

l
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The other form of "modernism" now in question is the critical writing of
the 1940's and 1950's which strained after the favorite terms of Cleanth Brooks,
irony and paradox. TIns was a popular but insular movement, largely confined
to America, pardy evangelical, essentially didactic, often ahistorical and contentedly ignorant of contextuality. Those trained in the American PhD factory
of the 1950's and 1960's have anecdotes about the process, often of an instructor
with the "text alone" who would chart meanings for a semester without contextual rudder or compass. I recall one lecture about "swan-boats" as though
they were from Wagner instead of Boston. David Daiches has his own example:
an essay by the American poet Delmore Schwartz on Yeats's "Among School
Children." Schwartz, ignoring context for the sake of ingenuity, misreads" taws"
as a scrap of Aristoteleanism instead of simple leather: "The taws or marbles
would be the concentric spheres which constitute the world for Aristotle and to
which the Prime Mover gives impetus or movement." Daiches says that this
U fancy
speculation" is "unmitigated rubbish" as is Schwartz's misplay with
"soldier" and "solider" (English Literature, pp. ]6 passim).
Some of the resentment shown Derrida's "deconstruction" arises from such an
academic boscage: p.art of the entanglement is from the highly elaborated fiction
of an often pejorative" realism"; the other is from the stolid doctrine of the
text itself, which was often celebrated with some intelligent discussion. Indeed,
the reader of Hartman's analysis of Derrida may feel the subliminal tug of the
teD(tual memories of Brooks's W ell Wrought Urn. So what are the differences?
Schwartz's tagging and pulling of Yeats may appear to be a methodic predecessor
to what some would call the antics of the new, new critical school. However,
very few past critical essays approach the subtlety of the following, quite remarkable for what it avoids, the overt sexual references that are very nearly incessant in the pre-canonic Dean's poetry. Hartman writes:
Donne ends with two uses of the same image, as if a double coda, a
double act of sealing, were required. The doubling increases our awareness that the image is only an image, the emblematic product of an imaginative faith. It is perishable and may need further shoring up. The
ending, unabsolute, provides a simulacrum of faith, just as parting is a
simulacrum of death. When we recall the initial stanza, which hangs
the evidence of life on a word, on less than a word, on a vocal inflection
Dr quantity, the difference between <l now 11 and" no"As virtuous men passe mildly away,
And whisper to their soules, to goe,
Whilst some of their sad friends doe say,
The breath goes now, and some say, no:
-then this tandem image is a whisper finely extended, airy despite its
solidity. It is only as affecting and perishable as all words that are breath.
(153-4)

Unlike the didactic evangelism of the "new" criticism, this passage takes its
strength from several sources, Derrida, perhaps, certainly Freud, and unexpectedly, such works as Gerardus van der Leeuw's on the phenomenology of religion.
In Sacred and Profane Beauty, the Dutch scholar writes: "A work of art strives
for independent life. The object does not matter. Whether the dove of the Holy
Ghost is painted, or the dove of the gutter, whether one paints a still life of
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bread and a cup, or calls to mind the holy symbols of the Eucharist, the attempt
to penetrate to the ultimate reality of what is represented will always lead to
another re.ality, to a second form." As Hartman also sees, one of the essential
constituents of Derrida is the elaboration of this perception through the media
of extensive lmowledge, awareness, and a re-reading of Freud which liberates
the writer from mere formula.
Derrida's Glas is informed, stamped, penetrated with phallic ambiguities, the
columns of text compared with erect memorials to the dead. Freud consistently
celebrated the acts of detection (perhaps in part to qualify as the designee of
"scientist"), noting the conscious and subconscious acts of analogy, the acts of
partial recognition and comparison in puns and metonymy. One of the major
differences between the now dated New Criticism and the Insistently Contemporaneous is the admission that the innate dynamism of language and thought is
not an aberration, is indeed a process too complex for mere "irony" and" paradox." There is no fixed or eternal utterance except that in suspicious dogma, the
pathetic masquerade of permanence. What unequivocally separates and identifies criticism of this present school is that Brooks and his colleagues of the New
Criticism usually accepted secular evangelism as ther.apy, not as a symptom of
complexity to be rigorously and scrupulously examined. Suggesting that there
are meanings hidden from the writer or speaker is therefore a suspicious demon,
extremely anti-hierarchical and heterodox. Most certainly, Freud is not" Christian." Patently, deconstruction celebrates Freud's perceptions in such works as
the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, where puns and mishearings arc clues to
quintessential states of mind hidden from the interlocutors themselves. Indeed, if
Schwartz had developed the idea of "soldier" Axistotle mth his legions of critical absolutists, his comment would have risen above academic CUt and paste
categories. Aristotle may be "solder," but in the academy he is also" soldier,"
a fit model for naive legions. Forty years ago, such candid arabesques were
punished with spankings, academic dunkings or burnings (metaphorical, of
course), enough to make commentators mask their insights with temperate manners and polite utterances. However, in Derrida and Hartman, the main impulse
is the celebration of difference, the analysis of levels of consciousness without resort to falsely unifying theories of language, psychology, or criticism. In Glas,
the levels of consciousness are giycn graphic form, with n:vo columns of text on
two different subjects, Hegel and Genet, each with marginal commentary. So the
"text itself" disappears as Derrida refutes that particular fiction with a critical
manifest exemplifying its own irresolution.
The dimensions of this critical act alarm some academicians to an hysterical
level. One commentator, twice published in recent issues of The, American
Scholar, has repeatedly asked that the critical text deal with" reality," by which
he means a graphing of univocal statement. Nonetheless, any utterance changes
v/ith the variation of context. Even the scholarly article plays with several
stages of meaning. The notes are themselves counter-texts, addenda to a body
of argument which itself is a comment relative to previous notation. The disingenuous appearance of stability is seductively simple, but only in a monogamous
sense. With critical commentary that pretends to be absolute, it is best not to
ask about the relation of what critics intend to write, what they do write, or
,vhat they conceal through accident or conscious intention. It is also best not to
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think of the levels of contextuality, the other works, the environments of the
subjects themselves, all of which affect interpretation.
For the dogmatic critic, it is also best not to observe the innately metonymic
aura of language, its inability to be controlled by one grammatical, critical, or
philosophical system. For not only are words as unstable as the complex of
breath, brain, tongue and mouth uttering them, they are each miniature histories of often irrational associ-arion, unintentional me.taphors of partial understandings and misrepresentations. Such tenns as II leaves" of a book, or anthology-" flower-gathering "-should remind a reader of this rich instability: its
generosity and unpredictability are in every term of the language. Part of the
spirited deviousness of Derrida's "La pharmacie de Platon," as Hartman observes,
is its potential ambivalence: Derrida "argues that Plato looked on writing as a
drug whose effects could not be controlled: words are potentially good medicine
... but when written down they become poison for the mind" (119). This is no
mere demonic conceit: the Greek pharmakon means either drug, poison, or potion. Throughout Glas, the titular term is used in its manifold sense of death
toll, glass, ice. The last two are of course reflective, as are in a different sense
the derivations from the homophones ghel,n,b each of which split into meanings
as various as celandine, nightingale (from geJge, to yell, to sing),n as well as
meanings such as gold, gleam, gloss, glissade, or appropriately for the "eagleHegel" pWl in Glas, glida or kite,b a gliding, hovering bird. Essential to understanding this form of esprit and geist is the recognition that etymology is itself
composed of metonyms, those imaginative germs of other tropes.
Haronan's commentary shows an ingeriUity merited by the multi-lingual erudition of Derrida, a peripatetic Jewish, Algerian, French theorist well-versed in
Freud and German and French philosophy. His learning is use.d not as a scholastic buttress but as potential for intellectual flight, conception, and reproduction.
In Glas, German and French, Hegel (archphilosopher, system builder, punster)
and Genet (fundamental lover and outcast, victim, criminal, artist) are the two
textual columns of sacred and profane. The virtuosity of Hartman's own commentary far transcends older examples of explicative wit, such as Ian Watt's
commentary on the opening of The Ambassadors which was once held up as
an unassailable example of critical ingenuity. In this instance, the gnomon of
Hartman's commentary is a witty elaboration, though in formal narrative, of an
intricately elusive dial-text:
Moreover, in the same marginal comment where the Sa makes its appearance, Derrida "invents" another acronym, Ie, for the Immaculate
Conception . • . . [A] gain, as with Sa, another near homophone is involved, so that language seems to motivate itself, as in the paragrams of
Saussure. Ie is close to the ici of "ici, maintenant" ... gliding via its
sound-shape into a concept and so echo-deconstructing it. The doctrine
of the Ie is ·simply an ici writ large, the exemplary instance for Western
tradition of a metaphysics of presence. (61)
Perhaps more than a few readers, .even "trained" or "sophisticated II ones,
flee in panic before Derrida's and Hartman's pyrotechnics. Two assurances may
aid the fearful: one, again, is the elusive na.ture of etymological gener.ation, words
associated with categorical associations, soun~s misheard, mispronounced. Walker
Percy in an essay published over twenty years ago noticed an amusing and in-
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DOcent mishearing in the American South, where rural blacks referred to juke

boxes, manufactured by Seeburg, as "Sea Birds." As Percy realized, this is the.
radical essence of imaginative language. Because I write this shordy after Ameri~
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lender has scant hope of repayment. Reference to any adequate etymological list~
ing confirms such irrational-rational relationships, floating half-determinately in
consciousness and record.
Hartman is one of the small band of critics who realizes the power, joy, and
pain of these tangential and dynamic relations of language, consciousness, and
accident-all necessary constituents of contemporary literary criticism if it avoids
3' past of narrowly overdete.rrnined literalism. Such an achievement, without the
guilt and anxiety of the older "modernism," is alone worth the interdisciplines
of critical literacy. The almost final words of this essay should be those of the
expositor himself:
From the start of Glas, then, we are presented with two illusory moments
of ecstatic identification some eighteen hundred years apart: absolute
knowledge, or Hegel's vision of an end to dialectic and alienation in the
thought process of the philosopher who has internalized history; and the
phantasm of the Immaculate Conception. (104)
Part of this explanation has already been briefly quoted, and it observes that
language is not immaculate, any more than the phallic columns and their analogy
of literary tumescence the critic describes or helps inform. Derrida, however,
has given a description of language that reaches into simple and directly observable acts of speech and writing. Like the use of the body, the acts of language
may assume) degrees of guilt. But it can no longer be said that the disciplines of
language Ql1d of criticism lead but inevitably to fonns of anxiety tha.t are beyond
analysis and description. Rather, criticism of Hartman's perception celebrates the
generation of meanings and physical v-ariety itself in their high and low, spiritual
and physical acts. In his commentary, Hartman neatly demonstrates the limits of
the guilt of Oedipus: oddly, ludicrously, imaginatively, paronomasia is as potent
a literary figure as parricide.
ROBERT MoYNIHAN

State University College of
New York, Oneonta

Emilesse Worke: Spenser and the Structures of Discourse by Jonathan Goldberg.
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. XV
177. $14.50.

+

One purpose of this study of The Faerie Queene is to examine in detail Book
Four as paradigmatic of the concerns of the poem as a whole. Given the lack
of allegorical material in this book, it is not unexpected that the author should
eschew allegorical interpretation and take as his subject its narrative dimension.
A Eecond purpose is to fire an opening barrage along the Spenser front, in the
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spreading war over what critical dispensation is to inherit Renaissance studies.
This is :t "deconstructive reading of The Faerie Queene," a label I put in quotation marks because they reflect the self-consciousness of the study's challenge
to Spenser studies, and to the Spenserians eminent and otherwise who have made
their reputations and part of their living elucidating Spenserian allegory through
traditional historicist methods. The Spenserians Goldberg does not cite are many.
and they are surely intended to notice these absences. The one scholar who is
consistently mentioned with approbation is Harry Berger, Jr., although even
here Goldberg must qualify indebtedness, which is more to occasional interpretive details than to Berger's governing archaeological schema. Central to
Goldberg's rejection of traditional readings of F. Q. is his conviction of "the impossibility of reducing Spenser's text to one-to-one allegorical meanings, or to
new-critical coherent pattelTIS of image, or to a thematics that makes the poem
a set of commonplaces of Renaissance or Christian thought" p. (xiv). Since these
constitute collectively the major enterprise pursued by Spenser scholars, Goldberg's polemical intention could not be clearer.
Displacing the commonplaces of Renaissance and Christian thought are what
I'
one is tempted to call the commonplaces of deconstructive thought. Goldberg's
authorities are Roland Barthes (of 5/Z), Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Denida.
To the first he owes his notion of the readerly versus the writerly text; to the
second the concept of the self as radically and irretrievably displaced by the text
of the Other; and he is indebted to the third's development of the concepts of
deferral, of supplementation, and of dissemination. To all three taken collectively Goldberg owes the collapsing of writer and reader into the text that they
make and that (un)makes them, a text that constitutes and reflects back to both
the frustration of desire for closure, for meaning, and for self-identity.
Goldberg attempts to describe "the narrative principles that induce frustrai cion, that deny closure, but that also produce the disturbed and disturbing narrative procedures of Spenser's text" (xii). What frustrates the reader of F. Q.
are the following: (1) no story proceeds to closure; (2) stories are interrupted by
stories, and characters fade into and are displaced by other characters; (3) like
the reader's frustra,ted desire for closure, the desires of the various lovers and
questcrs are frustrated as well; (4) finally, the writer's desire for patronage at
court is frustrated by a coy sovereign-figured in Belphoebe-who desires all to
desire her but frustrates the desires of all and disables (i.e., castrates) those who
woo elsewhere. The purpose of the poem is to teach the frustration of desire
and the desire for frustration.
Illustrative of one or more of these topics are the various episodes the author
examines: the reopening of the closure to the Scudamour-Amoret tale at the
beginning of Book Four; the shifting identities of writer, muse, and addressee in
the stanzas that preface Book One; the failure to reach the intended conclusion
of Chaucer's Squire's Tale in the story of Cambell and Canacee; Timias' reduction to speechlessness by Belphoebe; the wounds of unsatiated desire inflicted on
Britomart and other womeni the destructiveness of desire that Scudamour discovers in the Temple of Venus.
I am in sympathy with both purposes of this study, for I agree ...'lith Goldberg
that F. Q. has been concealed too long under the layers of allegorizing that the
naive historicism of traditional Spenserians has imposed on it. And I agree also
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that a deconstructive approach to the poem can yield impressive results. lV1y
doubts about the success of Goldberg's own dcconstIuctive strategies derive from
some radical equivocations in these strategies that Goldberg neither resolves nor,
had he recognized and used them for their heuristic value, exploits.
I can best begin by questioning a programmatic statement that occurs early
in the book: "criticism has, in trying to make the task of reading [F. Q.J easier,
often forgotten to account for what made it difficult in the first place" (xiv).
And yet, not one of the disruptions and frustrations that Goldberg uncovers are
things that the traditional reader finds "difficult in the first place." Goldberg's
is clearly a "second reading," one that has already gone beyond the apparently
"easy» henneneutic closures ,and allegorical recuperations one derives in a "first
reading," and has discovered the disruptions and frustrations of the text. For
Goldberg, most Spenserians presumably do nothing but repeat their first readiqgs,
treating F. Q. as a readerly text 'available to just such closures and recuperations.
The deconstructive reader on the other hand reads it as a writerly text, the text
tha,t Goldberg gives us in his commentary, relishing his own frustration and
thereby exhibiting his interpretive cunning. And yet, the projected reader of
F. Q. that Goldberg assumes is and must be continually surprised by the disruptions and frustrations of the text: he is a reader whose frustrations depend;
upon his reading's .always being a "first reading." There is something fishy and
inauthentic about a reader who is continually surprised but is never surprised at
being continually surprised, a reader full at once of guilelessness, cunning, and
therefore of bad faith. He tries to read F. Q. as if it were a readerly text, only
to discover his own failures. As a consequence, he must also read F. Q. as if it
were a writerly text, registering an awareness that the text is frustrative by design. But if this is the case then-lacking careful theoretical adjustments-Goldberg's reader and his reading both become inherently impossible: if one sees F. Q.
as frustrative by design, then one is no longer frustrated (nor surprised at being
so); one can in fact write a book called Endlesse W orke, in which the failure
of narrative ·and hermeneutic closure becomes itself meaningful.
Lying behind these equivocations is Goldberg's indecision about the kind of
text F. Q. is. On the -one hand, he treats the poem as a writerly text, one deliberately intended by Spenser to "deconstruct itself," and in tllls case Goldberg's o\vn text only makes explicit a type of reading intended by Spenser himself. On the other hand, if as he' says, F. Q. offers the reader the twin lures of
characters that appear mimetic and allegory that appears recuperable, then F. Q.
is a readerly text, on which a deconstructive reading must operate at a level
more radical th:m the poet's intention, to disclose fissures in the poem's structnres that these lures are presumably intended to mask. This indecision is based,
I suspect, on Goldberg'S apparent assumption that if F. Q. is a. writerly text it
cannot also be a readerly text. On the contrary, for him F. Q. appears as the
btter only to those traditional Spenserians who succumb to "first reading" temptations of allegorical interpretation, whereas it is the "second reading" of the
deconstructionist which discovers that these temptations are false and frustrated,
leading him to conclude that such temptations ought to be refused becausethey are not there!
Which brings me to Goldberg's radical misplacing of the poem's allegory.
Allegory is not, as he says it is, imposed by historicist readers as "an abstrac-
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tion" which substitutes "for the name of a character, thereby leaving behind
the narration and its actors for the sake of meaning" (76). That is, allegory is not
primarily a transaction between figured text and literalizing reader, but a transaction that occurs within: the poem itself, particularly in Books One and Two
where Redcrosse and Guyon exhibit radical problems in interpreting the allegorical characters and places they encounter. In other words, allegory and its
inteDpretation are one of Spenser's subjects, something that he problematizes for
his characters even as he problernatizes them for the reader. And it is the
former who are first frustrated by evanescence of meaning, even as they tempt
the reader to draw meanings out of their own actions and interpretations. Although Goldberg is correct in saying that allegorical interpretation is only substituting one figure for another (ibid.), he misses the full implication of dus
statement, JUSt as he misses the contradiction internal to his rejection of the
"lure" of allegorical interpretation as appropriate to reading F. Q. in general.
If "the text invites us, lures us, to these activities [i.e., interpretation and the desire for hermeneutic closure] and then obliterates the possibility of interpretation" (ibid), one may well wonder what these lures are doing there in the first
place. Why, in other words, should F. Q. present itself so temptingly to centuries of readers as something inviting and rewarding hermeneutic closure, if the
nature of this closure were not something at issue in the poem?
Part of an answer to this question is that Spenser traps the reader into believing that there is no problem of interpretation at all. Goldberg, I suggest, misses
the all-pervading interplay in F. Q. between readerly and writerly, between
temptation to allegorical recuperation and its denial, betv.reen the projection of
narrative teleology and its frustration. Certainly some of this is present in Goldberg's discussion, but he has not earned the right to assert it to the exact degree
that he has not explored the equivocation-possibly fecund, possibly sterile, depending on one's analytical acumen-implicit in his model of the text and the
model of reader response corresponding to it. F. Q. is not just difficult instead
of being easy. Rather, its difficulty lies precisely in its apparent ease, an Case
that masks and discloses the kinds of difficulties Goldberg discusses, and which
demand the kind of reader that Goldberg, borrowing from Stanley Fish, never
succeeds in rationalizing: a reader at once guileless and cunning, to read a text
at once readerly and writerly.
Part of Goldberg's problem in attempting to short-circuit allegorical reading
is that his notion of allegory seems to be no more sophisticated than that of the
contributors to the Spenser Variorum. That is, both seem to agree that allegorizing F. Q. means turning it into a ,'011lCln clef, a set of allusions to other texts,
which allusions when run to ground would give us the poem's "meaning." Had
he pursued Variorum-style allegorizing with the same intense insight he pursues its rejection, Goldberg might have found that the remarkable thing about
the Variorum is that it represents such unerringly right responses to F. Q. as a
readerly text, that is, F. Q. as a set of allegorical traps, of allegorical lures holding out to the reader the hope of recuperation. And in the interminable quarrels
about "right" meanings that are printed in its appendices, the Variorum unwittingly produces our first deconstructive analysis of F. Q., an analysis in which
frustration of the desire for meaning and closure is paramount. As it is, Endlesse
Worke in rejecting allegorical -moralizing. in refusing "to homilize the text, to
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find it voicing the commonplaces of Renaissance culture," only succeeds in doing
the same thing itself: homilizing the text, this time by drawing on the commonplace of deconstruction, and turning it into a sermon on the evils of desire. As
I suggested above, to rationalize the frustrations of the text is no longer to be
frustrated.
It is finally questionable that Goldberg serves his thesis well by taking Book
Four as paradigmatic for the whole of F. Q. Considering his blindness to the full
range of significance wluch Spenser gives to interpretoa.tion, allegorical and otherwise, in the opening book, it is not surprising that Goldberg should miss the most
important paradigm of deferred closure that Spenser offers us: the postponement
of the eschatological closure of world history otherwise "predicted" continually
in, Book One's references to the Book of Revelations, but finally denied Redcrosse and only anagogically foreshadowed in his victory over the dragon. In
other words, Book One gives us the central biblical paradigm of allegorical interpretation itself-the projection of historical types into the eschatological antitypes
of history's end-as the model of ~ll other deferrals. Featuring as he does the
synt8.gmatic, metonymical, and narrative dimension at the expense of the paradigmatic, metaphorical, and -allegorical dimension, Goldberg misses the central
conflict Spenser sets up between these from the very beginning: we see the putative "allegorical meanings" of Redcrosse's successive battles repeatedly undercut by unfolding events. Far from being that which the reader must eschew if
he is to engage the poem's denials of closure, the temptations of allegorical
closure-the temptation ultimately to idolatrous reduction of meaning to a single
text, the temptation of the Christian and the Spenserian alike-lie at the heart of
the de constructive enterprise that Spenser conceals within his text.
MICHAEL MCCANLES

Alarquette University

Romantics, Rebels and Reactiona1ies, English Literature and its Backg;round 17601830 by Marilyn Butler. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1982. Pp. 213. $17.95.
Those familiar with Marilyn Butler's other books on Edgeworth (1972),
Austen (1975), and Peacock (1979) will find her new work equally exciting and
innovative, as she has now become one of the most distinguished historical critics
of the Romantic period. Those, however, expecting a literary history which
synthesizes consensual views, with absolute demarcations between the nonliterary "background" and the foregrounded literature, will be startled because
this is a ground-breaking study. Although the word" background " is in Butler's
title, it is a little misleading because the metaphor, as it has been employed by
literary historians, suggests two separate realms which are mostly autonomous and
which connect at only a few points. Rather, Butler's literary history portrays as
body of literature from 1760 to 1830 that passes through four distinct periods,
each of which is socially determined, ideologically charged, intellectually polemical, and historically specific. The decisive turning-points are not caused by in-
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dividual thinkers (Rousseau, Kant, Burke), poets (Blake, Wordsworth), or critics
(Coleridge, Hazlitt) because, according to Butler, the social group, not isolated
individuals, generates a culture r..vithin which individuals can work creatively (see
pp. 9-10; 15). The book's inscription from Shelley'S A Defense of Poetry indicates her dialectical sense of cultural production: "Poets, not otherwise than
philosophers, painters, sculptors and musicians, arc, in one sense, the creators,
and, in another, the creations of their age. From this subjection, the loftiest do
not escape."
Periodizing English Romanticism has been an hazardous enterprise, vulnerable
to numerous inconsistencies and anarnolies, one of which is that the "thoroughgoing dogma of the mysterious, subconscious origin of art "-the distinctively
:&omantic notion of imagination's autonomy from the external world-" has to
wait for the 1830s, for the work of J. S. Mill, Thomas Carlyle and John Keble.
The doctrine is complete and widely accepted only for the generation after
'the English Romantics'" (p. 8). Posthumous theories of English Romanticism
have revealed as much about the -aesthetic predilections of the theorists as the
literature they were theorizing. Using an historical rigor infrequently found
among scholars of Romantic writing, so many of whom have derived their own
aesthetic values from portions of Romanticism, Butler reconstructs a literary
evolution from the perpective of the culture that produced and consumed the
literature. Although she qualifies her periodization with some skepticism over
the precise dates, the four periods are nevertheless distinct and coherent, even if
they sometimes overlap.
The first period, from 1760 to 1790, Butler identifies in the first chapter with
an Enlightenment culture marked by ml innovative, liberal Neoclassicism, which
is in part a reaction against the narrower Augustan Neolassicism, with its sense
of hierarchy, luxury, and rococo detail. Enlightenment Neoclassicism" initiates
the rejection of previous values, the intellectual and artistic aggression, that for
one and a half centuries has been attributed to Romanticism" (p. 6). Influenced
by some recent art historians of Neoclassicism, Butler revalues the English Enlightenment in a refreshing way, especially because Romantic studies have so
frequently accepted Coleridge's and Carlyle's view of eighteenth-century culture
as inhumanly rational and abstract, perversely individualistic, and aesthetically
impoverished. The aristocracy, which dominates politics and rules the society
during the entire 1760-1830 period, decisively shapes Neoclassicism, according to
Butler. Directly in Parliament and more indirectly as "culture's paymaster" (p.
179), the confident landowners resisted any encroachments 'Upon their power by
the monarchy in a libertarian rhetoric whose democratic implications far exceeded their aristocratic intentions, expanded their wealth with the agricultural
revolution and new investments in trade and industry, and cleared away political, economic, and ideological barriers that might restrain the aggressive pursuit
of their self-interest (pp. 11-16). Coexisting with tIus aristocratic insurgence are
social changes-rising population, the marketing of the arts, urbanization, class
consciousness-that ultimately run counter to the gentry's interests, but at least
in this period, the ideology of Neoclassicism seems universal, to speak for humanity. The sentimental and Gothic novels reflect the Enlightenment movement toward essentialism, representing the primary emotions and "man's" true nature;
all of this is discernible as well in social criticism and poetry that looked back
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to more primitive societies for durable values. Empiricism in science and philosophy, and the cult of sensibility in novels and poetry. both preoccupied with
studying how the mind worked, engendered a particular individualism that assumed a common human nature capable of engaging the world without the need
for authoritarian social codes. Moreover, the Enlightenment's subjectivism and
emphasis on feeling were eminently social, designed to criticize the corrupt
status quo and move society toward a more "natural" state. Reformist sentiment, strongest among the disenfranchised Dissenters, was widespread, explicit in
novels and poems expressing sympathy for a host of social victims, from War
veterans to prisoners. However optimistic the culture was in many of its modes,
it also possessed a "darker" current, which gave a voice to the anxiety caused
by rapid social change. The "nightmare" of the Gothic, and the historical
perspective of Adam Smith and Edward Gibbon, who portrayed social forces as
far more powerful than individuals, are congruent with the period's brooding
obsession with death and mutability; these, however, are different, more pessimistic responses to the same social phenomena that are dealt with optimistically
elsewhere.
In the second chapter she analyzes the cultural effects of the French Revolution, which alienated the English aristocracy from Neoclassicism and generated
the conditions for a new cultural period. From about 1790 to about 1818, the
dominant cultural tendency was consciously conservative and explicitly antirevolutionary. Many of the features traditionally associated with romanticism
emerge as reactionary counters to Enlightenment Neoclassicism. The cult of
sensibility becomes ideologically suspect, since the priorities of feeling and individual response suggest an individualism at odds with the new priorities of
hierarchy, hearth and home, and deference to social custom. Neoclassical essentialism, which evoked a universal human nature and an international focus, gives
way to a xenophobic particularism, a nationalist sense of England's specialness and
superiority, an organic notion of the society'S irrational but nevertheless legitimate
uniqueness. By the late 1790s, the Gothic falls out of fashion since its concentration on the individual's response to extreme situations is too morally relative
during the anti-French panic when traditional institutions need defending. Gillray's popular.ity in the later 1790s reflects not simply the aristocracy's wishes but
a general revulsion against Enlightenment culture, now identified with revolutionary France. Buder depicts the revolutionary decade as. creatively contradictory, with an unequal war of ideas between radicals and reactionaries. Her
portrait of Blake, for example, is of a Neoclassical artist inspired by the Dissent
tradition of reformism, the revolutionary hopes of the early 1790s, and the artisan
radicalism of London. Though unaffected by Enlightenment rationalism, Blake
nevertheless shared Neoclassicism's view of the human figure's centrality (represented in his famous design, "Glad Day" [po 41]), its international concept of
politics (his prophetic poems on the French Revolution, America, Europe, and
Asia), its individualism and its sexual libertariansm. Although Blake's mythmaking owes much to the native tradition of Bible-reading, it also reflects Enlightenment mythography, Neoclassical essentialism and abstractness. He turned
away from revolution when dle English reaction had destroyed the radical movement, which forked into an atheist rationalism he could not support and a retreating Dissent, which never again was at the forefront of reformist agitation.
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Like his artisan friend Sharp. Blake sought consolation in millenarian religion
that promised what politics could no longer deliver (pp. 49-50). Although his
post-1797 writings express defiant protest, it is depoliticized, with the new emphasis on mystical perception, a merciful Christ, and private system-building.
Similarly, Wordsworth went through a revolutionary phase, Neoclassical in almost every feature, then gradually abandoned Enlightenment ideas once he rejected revDlution. Burkean notions of family, organic society, the evils of intellectualism, the sacredness of English ground, and the superiority of rural paternalism coexisted ,vith strikingly Neoclassical remnants in a work like Lyrical
Ballads, and even TlJe Excursion, both of which were condemned by influential
critics for ideological reasons. Written by the no longer revolutionary Wordsworth, who was adopting conservative ideas, the Lyrical Ballads is ironically the
most rigorous expression of Neoclassical poetics. "Wordsworth's experiments
with subjects from among the lower orders of society, in metres appropriately
taken from popular poerty, follow thirty years of public interest in this matter
and manner, and are thus characteristic of the culture of the Enlightenment"
(p. 58). His originality rests with "the thoroughgoingness and consistency with
which he tries to apply Neoclassical precepts, and above all in his concentration
on \vhat for him are the ultimate principles, simplicity of language and truth to
personal expercnce" (p. 60). There is nothing in the Lyrical Ballads "that could
not have been written in 1788" (p.61).
The diverse careers of Gillray, Blake, and Wordsworth illustrate a characteristic of Butler's literary history: although ideological pressures and social determinants never cease to exert their power, they do so differently in different
writers, unevenly, unpredictably, and in contradictory ways. While the earlier
Borde1'ers by vVordsworth is a typical counter-revolutionary play, illustrating
the venality of the revolutionary intellectual, the later Lyrical Ballads is an
ideological offense to conservative opinion, not so much for aesthetic reasons
(Jeffrey actually liked the poetry), but for po1itical reasons, since the social order
had to be defended from democratic tendencies while the war against revolutionary France was not yet won.
I do not have the space to discuss the boole's treatment of other authors and
periods. Even my reproducing, in a condensed form, the first two chapters suffers from oversimplification. Indeed, the great virtue of Butler's history, no matter how prominent the social determinants, is the subtle discriminations and
qualifications she employs to make each period, writer and text distinctive. I will
give a brief sketch of the other chapters. The chapter on Coleridge depicts a
talented writer subject to new social pressures that affected literary production
and made possible a new notion of the literary intellectual. The chapter on Scott
and Austen, novelists of the gentry, restores the intellectual" war of ideas" and
ideological pointedness of their writing, but does so in a way that defines their
uniqueness and accounts for their development. The two chapters on the Neoclassical re-vival and the intellectual war between conservative Romantics and
liberal Neoclassicals derive from her Peacock book but include a lot of new material, The Neoclassical revival, from 1812 to 1822, initiated by Byron, Shelley,
Keats, Hunt, Peacock and Hazlitt, is unified by a polemical and ideological
counter-attack against a reactionary romanticism practiced by the older Wordsworth and Southey, but especially by the most coherent spokesman for Chris-
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tian conservatism and Germanic Romanticism, Coleridge. The revival, differing
in many ways from what it revived, is marked by considerable diversity among its
exponents, unevenness of ideological coherence in each writer, and important
shifts in emphasis at various moments. Despite the revival's politics, it did not
produce merely partisan propaganda, as Butler illustrates the writers' sensitivity

to the disturbing effects of historical change. The chapter on the Romantic
novel and prose distinguishes English Romanticism from its German counterpart
and discusses the final period, the IS20s, which is characterized by the religious
revival, increasing privatism, retreat from political concerns after the successful
post-Pcterloo repression, and new notions of the writer as a special kind of
producer and personality. In the concluding chapter she settles accounts with
som,e major romanticists (Wellek, Bloom) and criticizes some dominant notions
of English Romanticism that her study challenges.
Although Butler is not the first to write historical criticism of the Romantic
writers, no one has composed a literary history of the period like this one, which
weaves together such a diversity of authors and genres, which so thoroughly
restores the broad political intentions of such an extensive body of literature.
One leaves her history not with a smug sense that each text can now be pigeonholed into a social category, but with a new sense of wonder, since the literature is now mediated primarily not by our own contemporary notions of what
constitutes H Romanticism" but by the remarkable culture created by men and
women who lived in a different era, with their own urgent concerns. Butler
shifts the center of interpretive gravity from a dominant subjectivism, which has
derived authority from portions of Romanicism, to an historicism, which
acknowledges the specific, unrepeatable nature of that particular, ever-changing
culture. A history \vhich opens up the literature and makes it seem new is quite
remarkable. Moreover, Butler has illustrated by example that an historicist
methodology need not be reductive or moralistic (she likes the reactionaries as
well as the rebels and those in between), and that one can employ Marxian COll
cepts of ideology and social determination without so privileging structural determinants that social consciousness is a mere reflection and social intentions
epiphenomenal. She also writes elegant English prose, not arcane jargon. Her
book should spark controversy as well as new readings and interpretations of
the literature.
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The Tl'ans-parent: Sexual Politics in the Language of Emerson by Eric Cheyfitz.
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xv +
188. $13.50.

In a memoir simply entitled" Mr. Emerson" Henry James Sr. recalls his exasperation in trying to fathom the II awful and adorable" secret of his friend's
inscrutable genius. "How I used to Jock myself up with him in his bedroom,"
James recounts, "swearing that before the door was opened I would arrive at
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the secret of his immense superiority to the common herd of literary men."
Needless to say, that" secret" was not forthcoming, and James, playing the part
of balked suitor with evident relish, goes on to lament that Emerson was more
of a tease than a Transcendentalist. As impenetrable as "a vestal virgin" and
"as plucky as a women," Emerson's "immense superiority came to him . . .
like a woman's beauty or charm of manners." His genius strikes James as "somehow divinely begotten" or "virgin born"j indeed "Emerson himself was an
unsexed woman, a veritable fruit of almighty power in the sphere of our natu,re." Not many today will be likely to subscribe to this freakish opinion, but it
suggests a way of reading Emerson that Eric Cheyfitz is not only prepared to
endorse but make central to the argument of his book on Tbe Trans-parent.
Though he never refers to James's memoir, Cheyfitz has set out to demonstrate
in more extensive fashion what James's metaphors playfully hint at: Emerson's
ambivalent sexuality. In a wholly original and re-orienting approach to his subject, Cheyfitz sees" Emerson as at once a priest and psychologist of the combined power of language and sex, a worshipper of this power who is also bent
on analyzing the forms that this worship takes and that it gives to its 'object'" (xi). To the extent that this premise is a genuinely viable one, Cheyfitz's
own analysis unlocks for us many doors to Emerson (and not merely of the
bedroom variety), though in doing so it should be added that Cheyfiitz locks
some doors of his own.
Although it ranges throughout Emerson's works, The Trans-parent focuses
primarily on Nature, which is seen as dramatizing a "scene of sexual conflict"
or "power play" between masculine and feminine figures of authority. These
figures, "two hypothetical representatives of Emerson," appear in Nature as
"the FATHER" and as "my beautiful mother" or the" Me" and the "Not
Me"; the former' denoting the ideal or divine life of the manly power Emerson
struggles to attain, while the latter signifies the material, bodily realm of what
Emerson calls "the actual life" through which " the FATHER" is suggested
and revealed. Between each figure Cheyfitz posits a "child-hero" whose task,
Cheyfitz claims, is "to convert the suggestiveness of the mother into the satisfactions of the father" (4), to make, in other words, the "Not me of the
mother transparent to the "Me" of the father. Following Emerson, Cheyfitz
identifies this desired conversion as! a marriage that joins "Matter and Mind,"
the sensual and intellectual, or the motherly and fatherly-H in the ideal form of
this marriage in Nature, the mother ... becomes transparent, or effaces herself
to reveal the F ATHER to the child" (70). To consummate this marriage Cheyfitz's "child-hero" seeks a language which is transparent in the sense that it
discloses the father or meaning of the text of nature (and Nature) and which is
trans-parent in the sense that this disclosure appears as "a perfect absorption of
the mother by the FATHER" (58). But Cheyfitz is more than skeptical about
the harmony of such a marriage, which is vouchsafed not only by "a perfect
absorption of the mother" but through, as he shows, a violent excision or banishing of the feminine that insures the domination of the father. Emerson's marriage, Chcyfitz asserts, "appears to envision a transcendent idealism, and yet this
idealism only appears to to be a rhetoric of fear, a fear of that foreigner called
'feminine,' a xenophobia that parodies the masculine patriotism it tries to project"(67).
1)
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This compressed summary, however, does little justice to the ambitious range
and complexity of the book. Cheyfitz's interests extend beyond a simple case
study of Emerson's" ambivalent sexuality)) and his style is blessedly uncluttered
by psychoanalytic jargon. Instead, Cheyfitz stays as close as possible to the innicate contours (and detours) of Emerson's metaphoric drama, though this can
at times result in a rather bumpy l'ide, particularly in the first two chapters
where Cheyfitz, ill the manner of Emerson, jumps from topic to topic without
providing a coherent overview. Much of this is a necessary hazard, for Cheyfitz
is intent on demonstrating how the conflict between the masculine and the
feminine corresponds to larger political tensions between Emerson's conception
of democracy and aristocracy, the mob and the hero, or the" fearful extent and
multitude of objects" in nature and the unequivocal, transparent language of the
FATHER. Many have noticed Emerson's uncomfortable relation to "the reign
of King Mob" in the era of Jacksonian Democracy, but Cheyfitz's novel perspective yields a number of refreshing insights. His reflections on "the uncommonly
common" or "extraordinarily ordinary hero" of an essay like" Heroism" stand
as the most provocative account we have on this difficult issue since Perry Miller's pioneering study of "Emersonian Genius and American Democracy." If
Emerson's writings outwardly raise a revolutionary call for the democritization
of genius-a vision of greatness in which all can share-they also betray "a
nostalgic yearning" for "aristocratic repose." The hero simultaneously represents the commonwealth of genius (what Cheyfitz archly calls "the United
States of the Self") and is in flight from the anarchic, chaotic impulses which
threaten to degrade that commonwealth into a despotic mob. Noting Emerson's
propensity to associate the volatile, capricious, and instable with the feminine,
Cheyfitz places in opposition to this" motherly mob" the figure of the eloquent
orator, \vho epitomizes manliness for Emerson. The duty of the orator, according to Cheyfitz, is to domesticate the mob (and the fearful willfullness of femininity it projects) by ordering its passions and directing its will. And "just as
Emerson's orator must charm the mob in order to reveal its identjty with' The
Over-soul,' so the child-hero of Nat'w'e must charm 'the fearful extent and
multitude of objects,' the veiling language of nature, or mother, in order to unveil, or reveaJ, the identity of the father behind it" (121). But his enterprise is
at best precarious; seeking to charm the mother, the child-hero "risks seduction
at the hands of the seduced," risks, in other words, being usurped by the
"motherly mob" he purports to command. Cheyfitz usefully relates this reversal to a more generalized anxiety on the part of male writers like Emerson,
Tocqueville, 2nd Hawthorne that American literature was becoIJ1ing alarmingly
feminized by, in Hawthorne's memorable phrase, a "damned mob of scribbling
women." Drawing upon and extending insights by Ann Douglas and others,
Cheyfitz is particularly good in showing us how these writers alternately view
women as guardians of domestic harmony and potential harbingers of its dissolution. The fourth chapter, which is entitled "The Decline of the Father,"
perhaps the strongest section of the book, offers an exciting reading of the
blurring of sexual identities (as well as the" democratic language" that struggles
to articulate them) in a way that wholly revitalizes that tired shibboleth, "sexual
politics."
As the sequence of its chapters suggesE, The Trans-parent tells a story; one
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which begins with II The Hero of Metaphor," proceeds to II The Marriage of
Eloquent and Stammering Eyes" (Chapter 3), chronicles "The Decline of the
Father," and ends with "The Heroin,e of Metaphor." And yet, if Cheyfitz is
illuminating and on occasion brilliant in teasing out the political ramficatons of
Emerson's domestic drama, he can be less rewarding when dealing with its specifically sexual conflicts. The drama of The T1"anS-parent, for example, comes
to a climax of sorts at the end of the third chapter, where we are presented with
a reading of Nature's "primal scene." The "scene" or ,I spectacle" unfolds as
the child "watch[es] the intercourse of the mother and FATHER; as the mother
dies, 'fades and shrivels up,' the child appears privileged to have intercourse with
the FATHER; for the object of the spectacle, from the perspective of the hexo
of metaphor, is the marriage, or union, of the FATHER and child" (110). Precisely how or where the child witnesses this coupling and so " appears privileged"
to urnte with the FATHER Cheyfitz does not specify. Readers will no doubt be
futther surprised to learn ·that Emerson's resolution "not to fling stones at my
beautiful mother, nor soil my gentle nest" represents" a moment of excitement"
in which the child-hero II has forgotten the discipline of toilet training" (112).
From this it somehow follows that "at the moment of the revelation of the
child's manly identity, the mother appears as the faeces of this male form. She is
excreted, cast out of a purified body that seems no longer to need her nourishment, having digested her completely and put her to good use" (! 13). Aside
from the fact that Cheyfitz reconstructs this "spectacle" by gathering stray
phrases which can appear as much as twenty pages apart in Nature, the problem
with this reading is that it abruptly forecloses the "shifting imbalance of power"
or tensed ambivalence between the masculine and feminine that Cheyfitz is elsewhere so dextrous at highlighting. If this "primal scene" represents the "casting-out" or "death of the mother," why does she continue to pose such a
menace to Emerson, a menace that Cheyfitz goes on to develop at length in his
final chapter? What sh·:mld be the centerpiece of the book is pushed to an unnecessary and tendentit.:us extreme. Seizing upon random epithets out of context like "utter impotence," "erect organ," or II barren pipes" does not really
substantiate his argument but only trivializes it.
Which is unfortunate, since readers wary of Cheyfitz's methods will only be
further alienated by this momentary lapse at the expense of overlooking the
book's solid merits. This is of course a risk any adventurous thesis must run,
but then Cheyfitz expends little effort in attempting to anticipate objections or answer counter arguments with regard to the larger assumptions of his analysis. For
all the scrupulous and painstaking discriminations accorded a particular passage,
one must also wonder about the final image of Emerson that emerges. More than
once Cheyfitz suggests in his final chapter that Emerson's ideal of the manly,
commanding orator may be nothing more than a "dream" or defensive "compensation" designed to mask what Emerson perceived to be his own negligible
impact on his times. And yet, while we may agree Wtll Cheyfitz's observation
that" at no point in his life can Emerson be said to have commanded the mob"
to the extent he envisions for his eloquent orator, it seems a rather self-serving
argument to conclude that Emerson's professional identity as lecturer "precluded the manly command with which he seems so fascinated in his
works" (101). If Emerson never fully realized his dream of writing an eloquent-
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ly "popular" boole which would be a "Sceptre of irresistible command," it was
nonetheless a dream that continued to compel some of his best and most memorable writing for the better part of thirty years.
Readers will find many .other points of disagreement with Cheyfitz's understanding of Emerson's "sexual politics." But, even for the most skeptical audience, his book should be welcomed for treating Emerson with the complexity
and sensitivity his works so badly need and have so rarely received. The readings of Tocquevillc which accompany the analysis of Emerson are, incidentally
some of the finest on this author, whose Democracy in America has too often
been reduced by literary critics to a handbook of vapid generalizations. Whatever the local pitfalls of its argument or the reductive temptations which it invit~s, The Trans-pare,nt represents a substantial advance in our understanding of
Nature which future students of Emerson will not want to ignore.
KERRY CHAru.ES LARSON

University of Michigan

Joyce's Cities: A1'cbaeologies of the Soul by Jackson I. Cope. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xii
144. $12.95.

+

In his Preface to Joyce's Cities: Archaeologies of the Soul, Jackson Cope describes his book as "an imaginary coursing of stages in James Joyce's imagination." Attempting to place Joyce's work in its historical context, he maps out the
intellectual milieu of the turn of the century and charts connections between
Joyce and some of the dominant intellectual currents and historical discoveries of
his time. It is the period's fascination with mysticism, however, which most interests Cope and leads him to interpret joyce's \"orks in light of such figures as
the Italian poet and playwright D' Annunzio and such works as the Kabbalah and
the Egyptian Book of the Dead.
Cope's admittedly speculative method allows him to write sentences such as
the following: "A first coincidence at this time might have shaken Joyce the
mystic, had either he or its author-subject [Marinetti] been aware of it" (p.
106); "If he [Joyce] had also read the Maia poems, he would have found yet
another view of the modern waste land ..." (p. 30) j «It was just here ... that
D' Annunzio would have found a fact that he could translate into a mythic irony
that Joyce peTbaps echoed and clearly bettered in ' A Little Cloud'" (p. 34)
[Italics arc mine]. One of the primary defects of this book, which, to my mind,
ultimately overshadows the wealth of fascinating material it offers, is its lack of
convincing evidence to support the connections drawn between Joyce's work
and other texts. The "imaginary coursing" begins to resemble the documentation of possible or even non-events and connections in the "Ithaca" chapter of
Ulysses, where the catechism shifts from indicative to subjunctive: "For what
personal purpose could Bloom have applied the water so boiled?" "If he had
smiled why would he have smiled?" In his discussion of Joyce's mysticism, Cope
requires of his reader an overwhelming belief in the unseen.
In order to be specific about the leaps of faith I think are demanded by Cope's
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critical method, I want to focus on the fourth chapter of the book, tC Ulysses:
Joyce's Kabbalah." But before proceeding, it might be useful to sketch out the
significance of the titular term "archaeologies" and its relevance to the exploration of Jayce's work. First, the word refers literally to the historic excavations
of Troy, Mycenae, Crete, and Tutankhamen's tomb. Tracing the impact of
these discoveries on the imagination of Joyce's contemporaries, Cope shows how
they {)iIered the twentieth-century artist a wonderfully rich source of myth. He
argues, for example, that Evans's Cretan excavations affected D'Annunzio's treatment of myth, which, in turn, affected Joyce's. But as well as referring to actual excavations of the time, the term "archaeologies" refers metaphorically to
the process of uncovering the complex layering of history, myth, and image
that mal{es up the cultural psyche of an age. Cope attempts to "unearth" or
uncover the various layers of the turn-of-the-century psyche. (As a mapping
of certain dominant structures which inform a culture, this archaeological investigation loosely resembles and is probably meant to evoke Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge.)
So, for example, Cope advances the notion that the turn of the century was
more "mystical than mythical" and proceeds to map out the field of myth and
mysticism in D' Annunzio, Yeats, the theosophists, the Kabbalah, and the Egyptain Book of the Dead. He argues that D' Annunzio's "largely forgotten play"
La citta morta influenced joyce's treatments of "A Little Cloud" and Exiles,
and served as the catalyst for Joyce's reworking of Stephen Hero into A Portrait
Of the Artist as a Young Man. Cope also claims that contemporary interest in
the Kabbalah influenced Joyce's narrative technique and symbolism in Ulysses
and that the Egyptain Book of the Dead, as well as the historic discovery of
Tutankhamen's tomb, led Joyce to create his own Book of the Dead in Finnegans Wake.
In presenting the general cultural matrix of the time, Cope is often quite provocative-his treatments of the necropolis as recurrent image in early modern
literature, for example, and the particular combination of creativity and fraud
that allowed turn of the century intellectuals to "invent" their own cultural
inheritance are particularly fine. In fact, the decision to fl"eely map a cultural
field rather than slavishly trace a narrow line of historical influence in the old
sense is commendable. One applauds the potential liberation from constricting
positivist assumptions about "influence U that an "imaginary coursing" might
offer-for example, the freedom to trust in one's inruitive sense of the congruences between two texts or artistic sensibilities without the necessity of appealing to an author's explicit statements about influence.
But Cope is not content to map congruences or common structures. Instead,
he draws very specific causal connections between texts and insists on claiming
significant interpretive consequences for the discovery of these links. He attempts, in fact, not only to show that these texts influenced Joyce's aesthetic, but
that they were models for some major elements of Joyce's work. Because Cope
establishes such high expectations, we need to be convinced that Joyce was at
least familiar with the works that supposedly influenced him and that they and
not some other equally plausible texts provided the model or source. Since Cope
makes such large claims for specific textual connections, the reader does require
some biographical evidence of joyce's exposure to these texts (How do we know,
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for example, that Joyce had more than a passing knowledge of the Kabbalah?).
And, finally, a study of this sort must rest on both the appropriateness and usefulness of its inruitions-do the connections seem right to us and do they illuminate the text?

At its best, this book does draw some convincing connections, for example, the
relationship ben.veen D'Annunzio and A Portrait, and the relationship between
the Egyptian Book of the Dead and Finnegans Wake. But methodological weaknesses underlie much of the study and are most apparent in the chapter HUlysses:
Joyce's Kabbalah," to which I now would li1<e to turn. After presenting useful
information about the importance of such late Yictorian and tum of the century
translations and interpretations of the Kabbalah as Mathers' The Kabbalah Unveiled and Waite's The Doctrine o:nd Literature of the Kabbalah and The Secret
Doctrine in Israel, Cope proceeds by a series of assumptions to claim that Joyce's
method and narrative style, as well as certain specific symbols, are rooted in the
Kabbalah. But nowhere are we ever actually shown why he believes that Joyce
had extensive knowledge of the Kabbalah. (In an earlier article on this theme,
Cope ,disagrees with J. S. Atherton's assertion that Joyce knew the Kabbalah only
through the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Brittanica, but does not explain the grounds of disagreement, and in the present study not even this reference is given.) Because this is never firmly established in Cope's argument, his
use of specific passages or teachings of the Kabbalah to elucidate themes and
gloss passages in Ulysses seems quite presumptuous. In the interest of brevity I
cite only one example: Cope's explanation of Rudy'S death and the subsequent
"sinful barrenness" of the Blooms. Appealing to the teachings of the Zohar
(the Kabbalistic Bible), Cope argues that Bloom and Molly have defied Kabbalistic law by having intercourse during the day and, even worse, by engaging
in sex which was precipitated by Molly's view of two dogs copulating. Cope
links this sacrilegious incident to the blasphemous inversion of God and dog
found elsewhere in Ulysses and says, "The inversion by Molly and Bloom becomes a link in this tradition, if one pursues the kabbalistic teachings on the
mystery of sex" (p. 84). These strained connections lead us to question why
we should pursue kabbalistic teachings, that is, why we should believe they are
relevant to the judgment of Molly and Leopold Bloom.
However, not only does Cope claim that the Kabbalah influenced, Joyce, but
also that it indeed provided the impetus for the creation of a "new fictional
form n in Ulysses: he says that" Joyce was so drawn into the world of kabbalism as a structure that could be transmuted into a new fictional fonn ... that
he followed the curve of the kabbalistic psyche" (p. 81). This assertion too
seems unconvincing on a number of counts, for Cope fails to show why the
Kabbalah, rather than other possible models, is particularly appropriate. For example, his statement that both the Zohar and Ulysses are "systems at once abstract and concrete" (p. 80) may be true, but this dual aspect of Ulysses can be
accounted for in other ways as well. In an article entitled" Homer's Sticks and
Stones" (The lames loyce QU(fI"terly, 6 [19691, 285-98), Hugh Kenner argues
that the model of the Homeric myth itself provided both abstract analogy and
concrete particulars for Joyce. Kenner maintains that the archaeological excavation of Troy imparted a sense of physical reality to Homer's story, which attracted Joyce when he came to write Ulysses.
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Similarly, the argument that magic and mystical literature provide the sources
for joyce's narrative techniques seem to me to be equally questionable. It is
Cope's idea that the kind of cosmic comciousness that is part of Yeatsian "doctrine" and mysticism in general provides the background for Joyce's" narratoIless narrative." One may believe, however, along with others like Michael Groden
in Ulysses in Progress, that the background for this technical choice is more
aesthetic than spiritual, that Joyce became skeptical of the possibility of a narrator, in part at least in response to the limitation of certain kinds of narrative
strategies. Perhaps, also, the breakdown of the psychological boundaries of individual characters so that they share images and thoughts, another aspect of the
cosmic consciousness cited by Cope, has linguistic and cultural roots. Continuing
in the tradition of Flaubert, Joyce demonstrates that thought and langu?ge run
in grooves, that we all inherit idees ref us.
And, finally, Cope's general comparison between the highly schematized correspondences in Ulysses and the Kabbalah may hold true, but he fails to ac1mowledge Joyce's often skeptical attitude toward and treatment of mysticism, correspondence, and system. Cope dismisses too lightly Stephen's disparaging attitude toward theosophy in "Scylla and Charybdis," and the parody of correspondence, relationship, and exhaustive system in the n Ithaca" chapter of the
book.
The application of scriptural models to literary hermeneutics seems to me to
be an admirable enterprise, one which Frank Kermode in The Genesis of Secrecy
and Harold Bloom in Kabbalah and Criticism have attempted with interesting
results. But to argue as Cope does that the Kabbalah provides a specific model
for Joyce in Ulysses seems both unconvincing and, finally, unilluminating. The
literary payoff of such an investigation does not live up to its advanced billing.
Our understanding of style and narrative technique does not seem to be much
increased by this comparison.
At the end of Joyce's Cities, Cope refers to a "sympathetic encounter with
Joyce's mind experienced through his written corpus," a phrase that I think is
meant to describe the critical enterprise of this book. Indeed, Jackson Cope does
offer a sympathetic and often highly intriguing encounter with Joyce. But in
drawing such unsubstantiated connections and claiming for them such importance, he seems almost to ask us to accept his powers of telepathy as well as
sympathy. Joyce's Cities could have been a breakthrough in the methodology of
influence studies, but, instead, it turns out to be an often fascinating jaunt through
myth and mysticism that fails to lead to a true archaeological find.
KAREN LAWRENCE

University of Utah

Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism by Harold Bloom. New York and
336. $19.95.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv

+

Agon and its companion volume The Breaking of the Vessels (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1982) complete Harold Bloom's more than decadelong brooding on the sorrows of revisionism that began with Yeats (19iO) and
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Tbe Anxiety of lnfiuence (1973), reached a peak of theoretical elaboration with
A Map of Misreading (1975), Kabbala" and Criticism (1975) and Poetry and
Repression (1976), and bore practical interpretive fruit in his massive study of
Wallace Stevens, The Poems of Our Climate (1977). But these new volumes are
more than just refinements of the" system," for they are also acts of self-revision that look forward to what promises to be a definite literary analysis of
Freud, Tmnsference and Authority. In this respect, Agon is of particular interest,
as two of its longer and better chapters treat the work of Bloom's master in
self-revision. And even though nearly every chapter here has appeared previously as a separate essay in the five years since the Stevens book, Agon nonetheless makes a unified impression, one not solely dependent on the obtrusive strength
of the critic's personality.
The reason for the extraordinary coherence of these apparently very different
pieces lies in Bloom's obsessively pursued topic: the revisionary will of the postenlightenment writer, whether poet or critic. Bloom repeatedly traces the manner in which this will to revision appears in the major texts of our modern
literary culture. Bloom is fascinated by the many ways an author, brought to the
brink of blank desertion by the sudden memory of a precursor's long-repressed
words, can rise to the occasion and seize the opportunity such a radically disjunctive moment makes in a text. Into the semantic and rhetorical "gulf" of
such a disjunction, the strong creator projects a sublime representation of himself as' an inspiring heroic master of influence, a new image of the prophetic
voice to be reckoned with. Of course, this sublime self-image is necessarily a
measure of the differences between oneself and all those distorted or "misread"
recollections of literary ancestors that constitute the touchstones of the creative
mind.
For Bloom, a Jewish devotee of the Gnostic alien god, that primal forefather
who is also an aU-devouring abyss (or foremother), the revisionary moment is
a repetition of the original creation-fall that plunged the Gnostic pneuma or
divine spark into the prison of time, historical cycles, and the decaying human
body. Yet this repetition, as an inventive lie against its own belated status, also
defines the aim of the writer's quest for sublimity, which is to identify oneself
with and then to transfer authority to oneself from all those fabulous images
of his precursors-from Yeats and Blake, say, back to Jehovah and the Demiurgewith which the would-be creator has lovingly terrorized himself. The critic's
task, therefore, is to ask over and over again what Bloom wickedly terms "the
triple question: more? less? equal?" (193). That is, the critic must interrogate
and measure the competing sublimities of precursor and ephebe. in an attempt to
settle the issue of who really deserves canonical status among the other grand
cultural monuments. Given such a prodigiously tendentious vision and such a
delightfully malicious (if reductive) critical approach, it is no wonder that Agon,
for all its apparent heterogenity, produces a singular effect in the reader's mind.
The essays in Agon range from a theoretical discussion of how one makes
oneself an influence (" Agon: Revisionism and Critical Personality") and a close
reading of an ancient Gnostic text (" Lying Against Time: Gnosis, Poetry, Criticism ") to energetic encounters with Freud ("Freud and the Sublime" and
"Freud's Concepts of Defense and the Poetic Will") and a series of essays on
nineteenth and twentieth cent1lry American literary figures, the most important
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of which are the discussions of Emerson (" Emerson: The American Religion ")
and of Whitman ("Whitman's Image of Voice: To the Tally of My Soul").
These fifteen essays, considered in groups of five, serve to illustrate the three
antithetical models of poetic invention that Bloom now proposes. He analogizes
poetic invention with a catastrophe theory of creation derived from Gnosticism,
with a psychoanalytic perspective on the family romance, and with a rhetorical,
transumptive procedure of reversing images of earliness and belatedness found in
critical and poetic texts alike. In addition, Agol1 stands as a marker of what
Bloom calls "the American difference," a difference that evades by its willful
extravangance both traditional, Arnoldian forms of humanism and all recent deconstructive forms of antihumanism imported from the continent. That is, Bloom
asserts that only a truly strong, totally antithetical kind of stance can serve the
American critic as he faces an American canon of great writers in this time of
America's obvious decline.
The most significant feature of these essays is their revision of Bloom's dialectic
of revisionism first formulated in A lvlap of .i\1isreading and most fully worked
out in Poetry and Repression. In these works, Bloom argues that the pattern of
revisionary interpretation discernible in all post-enlightenment texts worth the
effort of reading could be reduced to an endlessly recurring cycle of three
phases or acts: an initial moment of limitation or ironic self-reduction; a second
moment of substitution in which the writer develops his sense of identity by reinventing the beloved masks of his precursors; and a fin:ll moment in which the
writer produces a sublime representation of himself as the only begetter of his
fathers and so of himself as well. (The ultimate source of this pattern, as Bloom
contends in Kabbalah and Criticism, is Issac Luria's revision of the Kabbalah).
In Agon this dialectic of limitation, substitution, and representation (or restitution) becomes the antithetical triad of negation (or cancellation), evasion (or
self-preservation), and extravagance (or exaltation) (see" Lying Against Time,"
pp. 59-60). The significance of this self-revision is really t\Vofold; the triad of
negation, evasion, and extravagance is more in line with Bloom's three models
of poetic invention discussed previously, and, as now formulated, his revisionary
triad would seemingly be harder to assimilate to more conventional notions of
the dialectic as drawn from Hegel or Marx. In this fashion, Bloom gives more
coherence to his baroque theoretical meditations and defends them against possible critiques from deconstructive sources. For deconstructors delight in nothing
more than exploding the progress of the dialectic wherever it is operative by exposing its specious logic. (Actually, of course, Bloom's self-revision here makes
his position even more open to such a critique than before, but space prohibits
going into this matter at this time; for the best work on Bloom of this deconstructive kind, see the first chapter of Paul Boves Destructive Poetics: H eidegger and Modern Ame1'ican Poetry, [New York: Columbia University Press,
1980]).

For me, the highlights of the volume are Bloom's readings of Freud. (The
essays on Emerson and Whitman, the one a hymn in_ praise of self-alienation, the
other a celebration of the poetic power of masturbation, while certainly extravagant, are too flashy even for my contemporary tastes). Bloom is at his best
when he is reading texts closely, with a reverence for the author that inspires in
him a concern for the more traditionally moral aspects of critical analysis. No-
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where does this humanistic side of Bloom appear more poignantly than in the
dimas of his reading of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle in "Freud's Concepts of Defense and The Poetic Will ":
Freud concluded "that the death drives are by their nature mute and
that the clamour of life proceeds for the most part from Eros." Can we
interpret this as meaning that wounded narciSSIsm becomes physical aggression because the loss of self-esteem is also a loss in the language of
Eros? Wounded narcissism is at the origins of poetry also, but in poetry
the blow to self-esteem strengthens the language of Eros, which defends
the poetic will through all the resources of troping. Lacking poetry, the
sado-masochist yields to the literalism of the death-drive precisely out of
a rage against literal meaning. When figuration and sarlo-masochism are
identified, as in Swinburne or Robinson Jeffers, then we find always the
obsession with poetic belatedness risen to a terrible intensity that plays
out the poetic will's revenge against time by the unhappy substitution
of the body, another's body or one's own, for time. Raging against time,
forgetting that only Eros or figuration is a true revenge against time, the
sado-masochist over-literalizes his revenge and so yields to the deathdrive .... Against the literalism and repetition of the death-drive, Freud
sets, so early on, the high figuration of his poetic will to an immortality.
Perhaps that may seem some day the truest defintion of the Freudian
Eros: the will's revenge against time's "it was" is to be carried out by
the mind's drive to surpass all earlier achievements. Only the strongest of
the poets, and Sigmund Freud, are capable of so lummous a vision of
Eros. (pp. 142 and 144)
Listening to this quiet but strongly vital love for Freud and his wisdom of trUly
inventive sublimation, one begins to hope that the promised book, Transference
and Authority, may deliver our most representative critic from his literal bondage to the Primal Abyss of the Gnostics.
DANIEL O'HARA

Temple University

Donald Barthelme: The Ironist Saved From Drowning by Charles Molesworth
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1982. Pp. 89. $8.00, paper.
Here, in Charles Moleswonh's version of it, is Barthelme-as-parodist, the
builder of collage-pieces, saving himself from drowning II in a world of fragments
by his ironic manipulation of them. And he is saved from drowning in his own
irony by a commitment to those fragments as the saving reality." This is a
clear, coherent argument. wise to all of the conceptual dangers. Or at least most
of them: notice how, in the sentence I have just quoted, "irony" and "commitment" keep slipping up against one another and finally produce" saving reality"
as their offspring. In this particular game, the critical-fictional stakes are very
high; "saving reality," after all, is a fonn of redemption. It is to Molesworth's
credit that he raises all the right questions and does so in a beautifully written and
intelligent way, but it is no surprise that he does a bit of drowning himseH before his shan book is over.

I

j

~

BooK REVIEWS

301

The customary question about Barthelme is how important he is, given his
microminiaturization of materials and styles. Molesworth addresses ths question
but wisely connects Barthelrne to issues in visual art, post-structural criticism,

and social thought. Barthelme's importance thus has to do with his canny strategic choices, in being careful not .to commit himself to subjects or styles that
cannot carry the weight of critical thought. Performance carries the weight of

critical thought, Barthehne's performance. So the feeling in Barthelme's work is,
like the subject, condensed and concentrated, and Molesworth's term for this
condensation is "affective overloading." To my knowledge, he is the first to
observe that Barthelme's work has so much feeling that the feeling itself tends
to disrupt the style.
Without giving readings of the stories or novels, Molesworth outlines four main
types of Barthelme's fiction, eloquently discusses one story, "Daumier," and, in
a witty and eloquent aside, repositions Robert Frost as a radically ambiguous poet,
comparable to Wallace Stevens or John Ashbery. All the central aesthetic issues
are here. Molesworth's tone is both sophisticated and straightforward.
But the book feels as though it is in some sort of strait-jacket, in part because
of the size of the issues Barthelme (and Molesworth) can raise. Start with irony.
Molesworth is more optimistic about it than Barthehne is. For Molesworth, the
stories themselves create in symbolic fonn a saving reality. But there is no saving reality in the stories, and in "Kierkegaard Unfair to Schlegel," the voiceir.onic though it is-says that irony gives only a poor and unsatisfactory pleasure.
Compared t.o someone like Ashbery, Barthelme seems more grim and more human
because he will not transform the materials of his art into something imaginatively
transcendent. Unlike Ashbery, he does not become a crypto-aesthete. His position remains more radical because he refuses to take a leap toward uanscendent
form. In all his work, Barthelme has wished to preserve the forms of his failure.
This is a truly radical choice, an unromantic one, and it has made him completely
aware of the commodification of outrage and irony in m.odern society. While
Barthelme is packaged as a "successful" writer, his irony disallows any success
within the stories; he will not even privilege interiority, as Beckett does. What
the irony does, finally, is to act as a dreck detector. In Barthelme's world (see
Snow White) there is only dreck, and so one's only strategy is to protect oneself
from it. Is this a saving reality? It is safe, but nothing else. As a poet and critic,
Moleswonh knows exactly how crucial these questions are, but his book has the
appearance of an outline, and the more radical of his observations glide by too
swiftly. It is as if M.olesworth himself had become the victim of packaging, in the
telegraphic fonnat of the Missouri II literary frontiers" editions.
CHARLES BAXTER

Wayne State University
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Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage by Stanley Cavell,
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England; Harvard University Press,
1981. Pp. xvi + 304. $19.95.
Seven of the nine chapters of this book are devoted to readings of individual
examples of a new genre Stanley Cavell calls the Comedy of Remarriage. These
include Howard Hawks' Bringing Up Baby and His Girl Friday, George Cukor's
The Philadelphia Story and Adam's Rib, Frank Capra's It Happened One Night,
Leo McCarey's The Awful Truth and Preston Sturges' The Lady Eve. Cavell has
unearthed these films from their usual generic resting places-the "Screwball"
and "'Romantic" comedies-and mounted them in a new relationship to one
another after reading Northrop Frye on Shakespearian romance. Following a
tradition from Elizabethan romantic comedy, these films "show a young pair
overcoming individual and social obstacles to their happiness, figured as a con~
eluding marriage that achieves individual and social reconciliations." As Cavell
understands him, Frye distinguishes between Old Comedy and New, according to
whether the drama emphasizes the struggle of a young man against an older
onc or whether the emphasis is primarily upon the heroine. Because they feature
the ,voman's conflict rather than the man's, Cavell's movies are "more intimately
related to Old Comedy than to New, but [they are] significantly different from
either [because they] seem to transgress an important feature of both, in casting
as the heroine a married woman." Thus, Cavell argues, the Hollywood version
marks a new stage in the history of the romantic comedy because the central
problem in these films is not so much to get the pair together as it is to get them
"together again." And the marriage which provided resolution in the Shakespearian comedy must here be understood conditionally, as "it is subjected to the
fact or the threat of divorce."
It might be objected that It Happened One Night, Bringing Up Baby and The
Lady Eve do not qualify for membership in "Comedy of Remarriage," since in
each of -them the couple is newly met. It could similarly be pointed out that
Adam's Rib lacks the problem of divorce. But Cavell deflects such possible criticism by defining genre in a. special way:
It will be natural in what follows, even irresistible, to speak of individual
characteristics of a genre as "features" of it; but the picture of an object with its features is a bad one. An alternative idea ... is that a narrative or dramatic genre might be thought of as a medium in the visual
arts might be thought of, or a fonn in music ..• the members of a
genre share in the inheritance of certain conditions, procedures and sub~
jects and goals of composition, and . . . each member of such repre~
sents a study of these conditions. . .. There is, on this picture, nothing
one is tempted to call the features of a genre which all its members have
in common.
In privileging <l conditions and procedures" over features, Cavell gains a certain
freedom as he moves between discussions of individual works and descriptions
of the larger generic text. For example, in reading those films which do not explicitly treat the subject of remarriage Cavell has discovered that the divorcereconciliation conflict is only one possible emploonent of a. larger narrative,
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which could be called the myth of estrangement: U Let us think of the common
inheritance of the members of a genre as a story, call it a myth. The members
of a genre will be interpretations of it, or to use Thoreau's word for it, revisions
of it, which will also make them interpretations of one another."
The myth common to all the fihns in this book can be loosely constructed in
trus way.

A running quarrel is forcing apart a pair who recognize themselves :as
having known one another forever, that is from the beginning, not just
in the past but in a period before there was a past, before history. This
naturally presents itself as their having shared childhood together, suggesting that they are brother and sister. They have discovered their
sexuality together and find themselves required to enter trus realm at
roughly the same time they are required to enter the social realm, as if
the sexual and the social are to legitImize one another. This is the beginning of a history, of an unending quarrel. The joining of the sexual and
the social is called marriage. Something evidentally internal to the task
of marriage causes trouble in paradise-as if marriage, which was to be
a ratification, is itself in need of ratification.
Cavell argues that in this "new" old comedy the central characters are not so
much struggling against external obstacles as they are pitted against one another and their recognition in each other of their failure to endure intimacy.
Resolution of the problem occurs when the couple achieve a new perspective
on their situation, usually from the vantage point achieved in a flight to an isolated and enchanted place. (Oddly, Cavell notes, in several of these Hollywood
comedies the Forest of Arden !Urns out to be in Connecticut.) The removal to
Eden is also movement out of time, enabling the lovers to "forgo and forget
their past state and: its impasse of vengefulness ..•" and to reenter the sphere of
sexuality free from the memory of crippled desire. Thus understood, any film
about lovers who exhibit a natural antagonism to one another can be included
in the genre. For Cavell, the rich versus poor opposition between the Gable and
Lombard characters in It Happened One Night or the conflict between the repressed intellectual and the madcap society girl in Bringing Up Baby are both
enactments of a drive toward union held in check by the memory of frustrated
intimacy. This is true because it is not the static features of divorce or marriagepresences in the films similar to such generic icons as fancy cars and stately mansions-which define the genre, but the fact that the several texts are animated by
a common goal of composition, in this case the elaboration of the problematic
of contradictory attraction and repulsion.
Cavell's understanding of genre as dynamic enables him to make interesting
connections as he accounts for the many variances in these texts. For example,
he argues that the previous marriage ostensibly missing from It Happened One
Nigbt is actually acted out in the famous H Walls of Jericho" sequence in the
cabin of the motor court. In that scene the couple live through an enforced
intimacy without sex which replicates the false start toward sexual union the
reunited divorcees in the other films have atttmpted. Thus, later in the film the
pair can look hack to a period in their relationship which was apparently a
marriage-they have pretended to be husband and "'Nife to avert their pursuersand this experience of a common past "'Nithout sex makes possible their second
" truer" union.
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The critic does not limit his creative reading -to the search for simple substitutes
for the missing fcarnres of the genre. Through the use of an operation he calls
" compensation" Cavell occasionally discovers new elements in places where he
had been looking for old ones. For example, he observes that in It Happened
One Night the lovers never manage an escape to Eden. Instead they a spend all
their time together travelling from Florida to New Yark, a fact which has
encouraged most critics to make the more obvious judgment that this is a "road
film." Cavell includes It Happened One Night in his genre by arguing that in
this instance the remarriage comedy compensates fOT the absence of the new
pell'spective achieved in an escape to Eden by providing the central pair with
a common "commitment to adventurousness, say to a future together no matter
what." Within Cavell's understanding of the way genres function, this conflation of a memory of the past with a faith in the future proves useful beyond the
text of the film in which he first encounters it. Moving from text to system
he discovers" that adventurousness in tum plays a role in each of the other fihns
of remarriage and (that) one may come to think that a state of perspective does
not require representation by a place but may also be understood as a matter of
directedness, of being on the road, on the way." This rule of compensation is
so important that it has a prescriptive power as well as a descriptive function;
in a subsequent operation Cavell eliminates Sidney Franklin's Private Lives and
Mervyn Leroy's Random Harvest, both films about the reunion and prospective
remarriage of divorced couples, because these movies lack the definitive characteristic of adventurousness in the play between the twO lovers.
Cavell's discussion of genre merits so detailed an explanation because it is the
most valuable section of this otherwise truly vexing book. Presumably, this way
of understanding genre has facilitated his discovery of the Comedy of Remarriage, a class of films hitherto undiscussed by film scholars and one which Cavell
has not invented. But the discovery of a new set of films with thematic similarities and the occasional provocative insght do not compensate for the many shortcomngs of Pursuits of Happiness. For several reviewers the problem has been
Cavell's overburdening of these frail Hollywood vessels with the weight of heavy
ideas-his discussion of The Philadelphia Story in tenns of Milton1s "Doctrine
and Discipline of Divorce," his reading of His Girl Friday in the context of
Locke's" Second Treatise of Government," and his examination of The Awful
Truth in the light of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, to name a few examples. But this
is not really the problem. Films deserve to be discussed with as much seriousness as anything else. The problem is that Cavell fails to make 'lny of these link~
ages telling. moving as he does so breezily from philosophical treatise to Hollywood text that both the written words and the filmed images become secondary
to the author's performance in bringing them together. The final result -is that
the reader begins to suspect, as Michael Wood has phrased it, that U the object
of Cavell's focussed interest" is not the text he purports to be reading but" whatever floats into ... consciousness."
Related to this failure to focus steadily upon the text is Cavell's failure to con~
nect his argument to any work on film not written by Stanley Cavell. In the
first: chapter. ingenuously titled" Words for a Conversation,1' all six: references to
other discussions of movies refer to Cavell's previous writings. In the 263 pages
which make up the bulk of the volume he cites other film scholars only six times,
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almost always simply to acknowledge a point of infonnation received. By contrast the book is dense with long digressions in the text and lengthy footnotes in
which the author rehearses some point he has made elsewhere. Occasionally these
directives read like advertisements, as when Cavell drops a note to explain that
his applied criticism in the. new volume is meant to illustrate theoretical issues
raised in The. World Viewed (which J. Dudley Andrew once described as "written in isolation") and to explain further that he has already made this connection
in an essay called II What Becomes of Things on Film." II Because not everyone
will have ready access to the journal in which it appears (Philosophy and Literature) I should like to reproduce its final paragraph here . . ..n Were he to do
this sort of thing only once or twice, it would not be so annoying. But Cavell
indulges in it constantly.
By his own admission Cavell's disregard for other film scholarship has been
damaging. For example, in the appendix to this book he tries to COIUlect his
criticism to that of Robert Warshaw, but expresses regret that he wrote The
World Viewed "not having !mown in time of Walter Benjamin and his essays."
This critical innocence is partcularly problematic because it appears in a book in
which the author is at such pains to justify the seriousness of the study of the
movies. After an introduction in which he announces that he U is not unaware
of an avenue of outrageousness in considering Hollywood films in the light of
major works of thought," he brings Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein
et al. to his analysis of the texts. Obviously, he means to show that films are
serious; but equally obvious from the tone of his introduction and the evidence
of his scholarship is the fact that film scholarship is not worthy of that same
seriousness. Thus Cavell's conversation is not directed at anyone who may talk
back, i.e. those scholars who have already thought about film and who would
hardly be outraged by his "indecorous juxtaposition" of films and ideas. This
is especially unfortunate because his methodology-discovery of a new element
in a particular work, return to the other texts to discover some version of this
element functioning in the various settings, redefinition of the entire "myth" to
account for the new feature and so on until the model reaches a "expensive
saturation "-is quite similar to that of those film scholars who have been influenced by Levi-Strauss. But Cavell never refers to Levi-Strauss in his remarks
on methodology, mentioning the anthropologist simply to make specific points
about individual films and using the tenn "structuralist" only in several offhand
and disparaging remarks. This is a serious omission because Levi-Strauss has been
widely employed by experts in film genre and is in fact routinely discussed in
such undergraduate textbooks as Thomas Schatz' Hollywood GenTes.
It seems likely that Cavell ignores conventional film genre criticism because
most of it takes an explicitly social and historical slant. His scholarly insularity
thus serves his philosophical position, which is to turn one's experience of the
film in upon the self rather than out upon the world. He argues that II one must
let the object or the work of your interest teach you how to consider it." This
premise implies another, which is "that to take an interest in an object is to
take an interest in one's experience of the object, so that to examine and defend
my interest in these films is to examine and defend my interest in my own experience and in the moments and passages in my life I may have spent with
them." The movement from object to subject begun in these :first two proposi-
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tions is completed in still another self-referential passage: "These remarks ...
I retain here if for no other reason than that they say things not said elsewhere
in this book about who I am, I mean who I is, who the I in this book is, how that

figure thinks things over and why such a one takes film as something

to

think

over."

Even if one were to accept the dubious proposition that this exquisite selfconsciousness provides a fruitful method with which to engage a literary genre,
it hardly follows that such an approach is very useful in a discllssion of genre
movies. Types of films become genres, that is, they multiply, in proportion to
their success at the box-office. In that way they are extraordinarily dependent
for their continued existence upon their favorable reception by a large group of
people, and in that way they can be considered to be "authored" by their audiences as much as they are by the teams of individuals who make them. For this
reason film genre critics have insisted upon the connection between their chosen
texts and society. Consider, for example, two of the many anicles which deal
with the same era as Cavell, Charles Eckert's piece on Marked Woman and
Mark Roth's essay on the Warner Brothers musical, both of which examine
thirties genre films in the context of the social conditions which produced them.
Roth's linkage of the studio and Franklin D. Roosevelt illustrates the ways in
which the Warners entertainment of this era successfully enlisted its audience's
support for the New Deal. Ecken's work, in which he examines the convergence
of several genres in a single film, might have been especially useful to Cavell because he uses a notion of structure not unlike that employed in Pursuits of H appiness. By uncovering a series of layered oppositions in the text, Ecken tries
to reveal the specific ways in which the content of a genre film "mediates" the
ideological contradictions in the cultural sirnation which generates it. Despite hs
promises to "account for" his genre, this is an operation which interests Cavell
not at all. He much prefers to employ the long lens provided by Nonhrop Frye,
and to telescope several centuries with a critical zoom-in from the age of Jonson
and Shakespeare to that of Capra and Hawks. In the same way that the telephoto lens collapses the physical space between the viewer and the subject of
the composition, Cavell's literary history seeks to erase the temporal gaps between the ages which produce the various comedies of remarriage.
Not surprisingly, this erasure of history leaves a few gaps in the argument. At
one extraordinary juncture, seemingly aware that his criticism fails to explain
the Godzilla-like emergence of his genre out from under the ice of several epochs,
Cavell decides to search for" '3 comedic precedent for the remarriage form more
specific than the Shakespearian." He finds that missing link II in Ibsen, and more
particularly, in I A Doll House'" (sic). At another point, perhaps recognizing
how extraordinary a formal genealogy he has laid out, Cavell turns away from
literary history to a more specific explanation of the sudden flowering of his
genre. Briefly sketching in the advances effected by women in the decades prior
to the emergence of the Comedy of Remarriage, Cavell suggests that these films
were made possible by the existence of a small set of women-Claudette Colbert,
Irene Dunn, Katherine Hepburn, Rosalind Russell, Barbara Stanwyck-particularly adept at playing the strong heroine the scripts demanded. In so doing Cavell
moves from the collapsing temporal schema of Frye to a kind of " great woman "
theory of history.
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These improbable explanations of the genre disappoint because they follow an
opening promise the author has made" to provide terms for understanding" why
his films emerge and disappear in the years between 1934 and 1941. They irritate

because they are offered as part of a conscious refusal to engage the texts as
social artifacts:

The explanation I have heard for this historical phenonenom-and it
seems to have become something of a piece of folk w1sdom-is that
thirties comedies were fairy tales for the Depression. . . . If luxurious
settings and fantastic sums of money were confined to the Hollywood
films of this period, and if Hollywood films of luxury and expenditnte
were confined to works that fit the genre of remarriage, then I would
be more drawn to an economic interpretation of the films I have interested myself in, or to an explanation of genre by economic causation.
Since the facts are otherwise it matters to me that that explanation does
not specifically account for the fonn in question,
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This refutation of an <l argument he has heard" is not very illuminating. Since
no scholar is named, no real engagement need take place. In addition, although
he discusses it briefly, Cavell fails to consider the real history of the cinema in
the decade of the thirties. The perfection of sound films in Hollywood at the
end of the twenties, which immediately made the national origin of a film its
most important commercial asset, guaranteed the worldwide preeminence of the
Hollywood movie since the greatest number of motion picture houses were in
English-speaking countries. Unlike that of any other national cinema, the American product paid for itself at home and turned a profit in dubbed versions overseas. This era of Hollywood's greatest expansion, which saw the natural development of sound-dependent genres like the musical and the sophisticated
comedy coincided with the era of the Great Depression. At the same moment
that the novelty of the sound film attracted large audiences those audiences were
concerned with economic issues in a newly intensified way. This information,
of course, no more accounts for the genre than does Cavell's invocation of Ibsen,
but a serious -and sensitive reading of the Remarriage Comedy could conceivably
try to deal with the way in which certain Hollywood texts used, or plotted, or
engaged, that specific desire in their audiences. For Cavell to shirk this task because other eras have also produced films about the monied is disappointing on
several levels. For one, such a decision controverts his own argument; if the
formal history of a genre is as important as he argues, then it seems natural that
genres from Hollywood's most prolific period will continue to be imitated and
placed in new settings. More important is the logical error in Cavell's suggestion
that the appearance of settings of wealth and luxury in subsequent Hollywoodl
movies precludes any discussion of <I economic causation." Obviously, the establishment of a simple cause and effect between the Depression and movies about
wealth is reductive. But that hardly means that the critic should ignore these
issues and go off in search of the phenomenal self in the text. It isn't as if, as
Cavell's citation of the continued appearance of movies about money implies,
the public's persistent interest in characters untouched by hunger and poverty
invalidates all connectiom between the real suffering of the Depression and the
Remarriage Comedy'S essential disinterest in that suffering. And it certainly does
not follow that, because the poor are always with us, the denial of their significance by the Remarriage Comedy bears no analysis.
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Because he is an extraordinarily insightful critic, Cavell anticipates such an objection. In fact, it is one of the failures of this book that he is so concerned to
antcipate all criticism that he frequently leaves the text to tilt with some interlocutor of his own imagining. In the particular instance at hand, however, he has
conjured up an antagonist whose position anticipates my own. It occurs in a
discussion of the" Depression vignette" in It Happened One Nigbt, when a
a woman faints from hunger on a bus. Cavell's argument is that this is a film
about" hungering, where hungering is a metaphor for imagining," and that Capra
is "taking the occasion of the Depression to ask what it is we as a people are
truly depressed by. what hunger it is from which we are all faint?" Cavell reasonably asks if such an intention on Capra's part is morally irresponsible, like
"aestheticizing or transcendentalizing human suffering." His answer is no, since
this is a criticism all serious art which tries to portray suffering must risk. He
buttresses his point with a quotation. and his gloss of it, from Emerson: "Do
not tell me, as a good man did today, of my obligation to put all poor men in
good situations. Are they my poor? That is, it is not I who make them and who
keep them poor; and so far as I can better the situation of whoever is poor I
can only do it by answering my genius when it calls. But to give this sort of
answer one must have a healthy respect for the value of one's work. let us say
for its powers of instruction and redemption." However appropriate such a response may be for Emerson, and however relevant it is to Frank Capra, it is
difficult not to read this passage, given Cavell's scholarly self-reliance, as a defense of his own work. It is equally difficult, given the relative infrequency of
PU1'suits of Happiness's instructive and redemptive passages, to accord Cavell's
book that respect he seems to be asking for. Not only does this book refuse to
engage some of the most important questions raised by these films, it poses several questions of its own. What drives the critic to perform these disabling operations upon the texts? What is the institutional context which encourages the
scholar to detach these movies-created by hundreds of people, consumed by
thousands-so completely from their social functioning? What force in the academic situation demands that they be contemplated at so great a remove?
DENNIS TURNER

Wayne State University
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